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APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-2a-3(2)(j). This appeal was

poured over from the Utah Supreme Court on September 4, 1998.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
This is an appeal from a summary judgment as to each of appellant's claims. The court
reviews summary judgment for correctness, without deference to the trial court. The court
"determine[s] only whether the trial court erred in applying the governing law and whether the
trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact." Ferree v. State, 784
P.2dl49, 151 (Utah 1989).
The issues raised on summary judgment were as follows:
1.

Whether the undisputed facts demonstrate that, as a matter of law, Schulman

owed no duty of care to appellant capable of supporting a negligence claim. Standard of
Review: correction of error. Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co., 821 P.2d 458, 460 (Utah App. 1991).
2.

Whether the undisputed facts demonstrate that, as a matter of law, appellant failed

to establish an element of the claim for abuse of process. Standard of Review: correction of
error. Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah
1990).
3.

Whether the undisputed facts demonstrate that, as a matter of law, plaintiffs

claims for slander of title/wrongful lien were moot. Standard of Review: correction of error.
Transamerica Cash Reserve, 789 P.2d at 25.
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 38-9-1

A person who claims an interest in, or a lien or encumbrance against, real property, who
causes or has caused a document asserting that claim to be recorded or filed in the office of the
county recorder, who knows or has reason to know that the document is forged, groundless, or
contains a material misstatement of false claim, is liable to the owner or title-holder for $1,000 or
for treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees, and costs as
provided in this chapter, if he willfully refuses to release or correct such document of record
within 20 days from the date of written request from the owner or beneficial title-holder of the
real property. This chapter is not intended to be applicable to mechanics' or materialmen's liens.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-40-2

In any action affecting the title to, or the right of possession of, real property the plaintiff
at the time of filing the Complaint or thereafter, and the defendant at the time of filing his answer
when affirmative relief is claimed in such answer, or at any time afterward, may file for record
with the recorder of the county in which the property or some part thereof is situated a notice of
the pendency of the action, containing the names of the parties, the object of the action or
defense, and a description of the property in that county affected thereby. From the time of filing
such notice for record only shall a purchaser or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby be
deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only its pendency against
parties designated by their real names.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case: This is an action to recover attorney fees allegedly incurred by
reason of the recording of a lispendens on appellant's property. Appellant and defendant Allison
Abizaid were divorced in California in 1989. Schulman, a California attorney, later represented
Abizaid in a post-divorce proceeding to enforce the divorce decree. One of the issues raised in
the post-divorce proceedings was the disposition of certain community property in Salt Lake
County. Schulman caused a lis pendens to be recorded on that property because it was purchased
with community funds. Schulman later filed a motion in the California proceedings to, among
other things, restrain plaintiff from disposing of or encumbering that property. The grounds for
that motion were that the property was community property under California law (having been
purchased with community funds). A restraining order was issued, and the lis pendens was
released.
Course of proceedings and disposition below: Appellant brought this action against
Schulman and Abizaid, complaining that the recording of the lis pendens was negligent, an abuse
of process and was slander of title or a wrongful lien. Appellant later stipulated to a dismissal of
the claims against Abizaid. On cross-motions for summary judgment, where appellant conceded
the material facts, the court denied appellant's motion and granted Schulman's cross-motion. A
copy of the order is in the appendix as Exhibit A.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Preamble: The material facts were not disputed. As required by rule 4-501(2)(A) of the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Schulman's opening summary judgment memorandum
began with a properly supported statement of undisputed facts.

Plaintiffs opposition

memorandum did not challenge any of those facts and stated instead that "[t]he core or operative
facts of the case are agreed upon and are not in material dispute." (R. 346). Accordingly, the
following facts were not disputed.
1.

UTAH CODE JUD. ADMIN.

4-501(2)(B).

Schulman was the attorney for Allison Abizaid from May 5, 1995 to January 10,

1996 in the California divorce case styled In re the Marriage of Allison Abizaid, petitioner and
David Winters, respondent (case no. D88-06750). (R. 321).
2.

Schulman was retained by Abizaid to enforce a judgment and decree of divorce in

the above-referenced action. A copy of the divorce decree is included at R. 259-60. (R. 321,
338).
3.

After the divorce, appellant used funds obtained from a second mortgage on

California community property to purchase his Utah property. (R. 321, 337).
4.

It was Schulman's opinion that Abizaid had a community interest in that property

based on California law. In 1992, Abizaid quit claimed her interest in the Utah property to
appellant pursuant to an agreement by which he would refinance the Utah property and pay
Abizaid amounts owing under the divorce decree. It was because of that express promise that
Abizaid would be paid that she agreed to quit claim her ownership interest in the Utah residence.

A

Her community interest remained, however, because the property was purchased with
community funds which had not been repaid. (R. 321-22, 337-38, 256).
5.

On October 20, 1995, Schulman filed a motion in the California proceedings on

behalf of Abizaid for attorneys fees, sanctions, determination of amounts due and enforcement of
judgment of the dissolution of the marriage. (R.322, 252).
6.

The specific relief requested in the California motion was, among other things,

that "the court order a lien against [appellant's] real property in Utah until said sum, plus any
attorneys fees and sanctions, are paid in full." (R. 322).
7.

Abizaid further requested in that motion an order restraining appellant from

borrowing against or otherwise disposing of his Utah property until he had fully paid and
satisfied the terms of the judgment of dissolution of the marriage. (R. 322, 256, 254)
8.

In anticipation of filing the California motion, Abizaid signed and Schulman

caused to be recorded a lis pendens on appellant's Utah property. (R. 322, 338-39). A copy of
the lis pendens is at R. 277.
9.

The lis pendens was authorized by rule 1219 of the procedural rules under

California's family code. The lis pendens was used because the California proceedings were
brought to protect Abizaid's community interest in the Utah property. Schulman had and has no
personal interest in appellant's property. (R. 322).
10.

In December of 1995, Schulman and Abizaid were named as co-defendants in this

action. On January 10, 1996, Schulman was forced to withdraw as counsel for Abizaid in the
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California proceedings because of a potential conflict of interest in light of the action against
both of them. (R. 322-23).
11.

Appellant filed a memorandum and an affidavit in opposition to the California

motion. Copies of those opposition papers are at R. 280 and 292. (R. 323). Schulman filed on
behalf of Abizaid a reply memorandum in support of the California motion, along with a second
affidavit. (R. 323). Copies of that reply and the affidavit are at R. 302 and 307. (R. 323).
12.

On April 19, 1996, a hearing was held in the California proceedings during which

the court ordered that the lis pendens be released. (R. 323). A copy of the court's order from
that hearing is at 313. (R.323). The court order also granted Abizaid's request for a restraining
order on appellant's Utah property under
13.

CAL. FAM. CODE

§ 2045. (R. 313, 323, 340).

On April 23, 1996, appellant filed in this action a motion for partial summary

judgment specifically requesting that the lis pendens be released and requesting attorneys fees.
(R.323, 55). That motion was supported by a memorandum, appellant's affidavit and an affidavit
of counsel. Copies of those papers are at R. 55, 90, 107.
14.

The hearing in the California matter was continued until May 31, 1996 to decide

the issue of attorney fees. (R. 323). Both parties had motions for fees, but each party was
ultimately ordered to pay their own fees. (R. 323, 248).
15.

At the May 31, 1996 hearing, the California court vacated the restraining order on

the Utah property. The court also ordered that a $10,000 payment owed to Abizaid be secured by
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a deed of trust on the Utah property. (R. 323, 315, 249). A copy of the order from the May 31,
1996 hearing is at R. 315. (R. 323).
16.

Because Schulman had to substitute new counsel for Abizaid in the California

proceedings after this action was filed, she could have no further involvement in the case after
withdrawing on January 10, 1996. She could not take any action to release the Us pendens on the
Utah property. (R. 324, 249).
17.

When Schulman advised the recording of the lis pendens on the Utah property,

she did so in Abizaid's best interest. The California court ultimately granted the motion and
issued an order restraining appellant from encumbering or otherwise disposing of his Utah
property. (R. 324, 249, 307).
18.

The court later lifted the restraining order and ordered that a trust deed be placed

on that same property to secure payment to Abizaid for the very funds she was seeking in the
California motion. (R. 324, 249).
19.

Schulman has never been a plaintiff in an unsuccessful action, or any other action,

against appellant. She gave the advice concerning the lis pendens in good faith and pursuant to
California law based on Abizaid's community property interest in the Utah property. (R. 324,
249).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CONCLUDED CORRECTLY
MATERIAL FACTS WERE UNDISPUTED.

THAT

THE

The mechanics of opposing a summary judgment motion are precise. When the moving
party establishes a set of facts based on citations to the record (in this case affidavits), the
opposing party must demonstrate, also with citations to the record, that the material facts are
disputed.

Here, appellant did not bother to try and dispute Schulman's properly supported

statement of facts. Appellant essentially stipulated to those facts. The trial court's first task on
summary judgment—assuring an undisputed record—was easy. The trial court thus did not err
in concluding that the facts were undisputed.
II.

THE
TRIAL
COURT
CONCLUDED
CORRECTLY
THAT
APPELLANT'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIM FAILED BECAUSE SCHULMAN
DID NOT OWE APPELLANT A DUTY OF CARE.

A duty of care is a question of law. It turns on a number of factors, but its core is whether
there is any particular obligation between the plaintiff and the defendant. It is not, as appellant
suggests, an abstract question of courtesy. Nor can a duty be conjured merely because lawful
conduct results in inconvenience to another. Schulman represented appellant's ex-spouse in post
divorce proceedings. Her duty was to her client, not appellant. She took steps to protect her
client's undisputed community property interests. Inconvenience to appellant in the context of
those proceedings is to be expected. It does not give rise to a duty of care. Without a duty, there
is no negligence as a matter of law.

III.

THE
TRIAL
COURT
CONCLUDED
CORRECTLY
THAT
APPELLANT'S ABUSE OF PROCESS CLAIM FAILED BECAUSE THE
CRITICAL ELEMENT OF THE CLAIM WAS MISSING.

Abuse of process requires a prior unsuccessful and meritless action in which the plaintiff
in the abuse of process claim was the successful defendant. That never happened. Schulman
represented Abizaid in a proceeding to enforce a divorce decree. Schulman was not the plaintiff
in that matter. And, incidentally, the prior matter was successful. The California court granted
Abizaid's request that appellant be restrained from encumbering or disposing of the Utah
property. Only then was the lis pendens ordered released (long after Schulman's withdrawal,
which was necessitated by this action). Without that foundational element, appellant's abuse of
process claim failed.
IV. T H E
TRIAL
COURT
CONCLUDED
CORRECTLY
THAT
APPELLANT'S CLAIMS W E R E M O O T AFTER T H E CALIFORNIA C O U R T
O R D E R E D T H E RELEASE OF T H E LIS PENDENS A N D ENTERED ITS
RESTRAINING ORDER.
After this action was filed, the California court heard arguments regarding the lis
pendens. That court ordered that the lis pendens be released and that appellant was restrained
from encumbering or transferring the Utah property. The court also denied appellant's claim for
attorney fees.

That ruling, which resulted in the restriction on the Utah property, mooted

appellant's claims that the lis pendens clouded or interfered with his title or use of the property.
The Utah court was then unable to grant relief for slander of title or wrongful lien because the
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California court ruled essentially that title to or possession of that property was in issue in the
California proceedings.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY THAT APPELLANT'S
"TITLE CLAIMS" FAILED AS A MATTER OF LAW.

Appellant labeled one of his claims as "quiet title," but apparently thought the better of
it—given that Schulman did not claim an interest in title—and argued slander of title and
wrongful lien. The trial court rejected the claim because it was moot. The court ruled that when
the lis pendens was released (notably, before appellant brought his summary judgment motion,
the denial of which forms part of this appeal) and appellant was restrained from disposing of his
property, the court was unable to grant the relief appellant requested. That is the essence of
mootness.
The trial court's reasoning was sound and was surely informed by the California court's
ruling. The California proceedings resulted in precisely the relief requested there: a restraining
order preserving the Utah property and then ultimately a trust deed on that property securing the
sum owed Abizaid. Appellant's claim that his title was slandered or liened wrongfully ended
when the California court decided that it was not. The trial court could not adjudicate damages
for an allegedly slanderous lis pendens when the lis pendens served its intended purpose (notice
of the California proceedings) and was then released.

m

VI.

THIS COURT CAN AFFIRM ON ANY GROUNDS, INCLUDING
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND PRIVILEGE.

Schulman also argued that the claims regarding the lis pendens were barred by collateral
estoppel and privilege. Collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of issues already decided. The
issue driving the California proceedings was appellant's Utah property. The parties briefed the
propriety of looking to that property for relief, and appellant specifically attacked the use of the
lis pendens. The California court granted Abizaid's motion that appellant be restrained from
disposing of or encumbering the Utah property. The California court denied appellant's request
for attorney fees incurred in litigating that issue. It is that issue and those fees that are driving
this case. The trial court's summary judgment can be affirmed on the grounds of collateral
estoppel.
A second available basis for affirmance is privilege. Schulman's recording of the lis
pendens, which merely republishes the pleadings in the underlying case, was privileged. If the
underlying action relates to title to real property, a lis pendens is appropriate. Not recording one
when community property interests are asserted is surely malpractice.

Because Abizaid's

requested relief in the California proceedings was a restraining order, based on her undisputed
community property interest, title or possession was indeed affected.
notice. Recording it was, therefore, privileged.
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The lis pendens gave

VII.

APPELLANTS OTHER ARGUMENTS ARE WITHOUT MERIT.

With little coherency, appellant offers a slew of arguments attacking the lis pendens. Each fails.
The first lis pendens was recorded in Salt lake County, where the property is located. Second,
the California court, having jurisdiction over the parties, properly adjudicated their community
property interest. Third, because of her community property interests, Abizaid was permitted to
use a lis pendens to give notice of the California divorce action. Finally, the wrongful lien
statute does not apply. Schulman never claimed an interest in the Utah property, and the lis
pendens did not contain any material misstatement or false claim.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT CONCLUDED CORRECTLY THAT THE
MATERIAL FACTS WERE UNDISPUTED.

Opposition to a summary judgment motion requires "a concise statement of material facts
as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated in
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon
which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences
of the movant's facts that are disputed."

UTAH CODE JUD. ADMIN.

4-501(2)(B).

Unless

specifically controverted in this way, the properly supported facts "shall be deemed admitted..."
Id.
Schulman's summary judgment memorandum contained a separately numbered statement
of facts with record citations. (R. 321-24). Appellant did not attempt a single refutation. He
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essentially conceded the facts. (R. 346)("The core or operative facts of the case are agreed upon
and are not in material dispute."). Accordingly, the trial court ruled correctly in that the material
facts were not disputed. (R. 396).
II.

THE
TRIAL
COURT
CONCLUDED
CORRECTLY
THAT
APPELLANT'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIM FAILED BECAUSE SCHULMAN
DID NOT OWE APPELLANT A DUTY OF CARE.

Absent a duty of care, there is no negligence as a matter of law, and summary judgment is
appropriate. Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City, 887 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah
1994). "Duty is 'a question of whether the defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of a
particular plaintiff . . . ." Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989), quoting W. Page
Keeton et aL, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 356-57 (5th ed. 1984).
"It has long been held, with few exceptions, ... that the obligation of an attorney is to his
client and not a third party." Hughes v. Housley, 599 P.2d 1250, 1253-54 (Utah 1979).1 In
Hughes, a defendant in a negligence action brought a third party claim against an attorney
alleging that the attorney's negligence created the liability for which the defendant was being
sued. The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the third-party claim because there was no duty
running from the attorney to the third party plaintiff. Id. This is the rule. See 61 A.L.R. 4th 615
(1988)

1

The exceptions referred to are based on a theory of third-party beneficiary relationship between
the client and the third party. A classic example is the beneficiary under a will who loses out
because the will was negligently drafted. See 61 A.L.R. 4th 615 (1988).
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It is undisputed that Schulman was the attorney for Abizaid.

She did not represent

appellant. (R. 321, 338(H 11), 324, 249). As a matter of law, she did not owe appellant a duty of
care. Appellant's attempt to support his claim with the Utah Rules of Professional conduct is
ridiculous. Schulman is a California attorney. Furthermore, those rules "are not designed to
create a basis for civil liability." Archuleta v. Hughes, 353

UTAH ADV. REP.

17, 19 (October 2,

1998), citing Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1291 n.3 (Utah App. 1996),
cert, denied, 919 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1996). Accordingly, summary judgment on the negligence
claim was correct.2
III.

THE
TRIAL
COURT
CONCLUDED
CORRECTLY
THAT
APPELLANT'S ABUSE OF PROCESS CLAIM FAILED BECAUSE THE
CRITICAL ELEMENT OF THE CLAIM WAS MISSING.

Abuse of process is the use of a legal process "primarily to accomplish a purpose for
which it is not designed...." Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 959 (Utah App.
1989). A claim for abuse of process "requires that the [prior] proceedings have terminated in
favor of the person against whom they were brought." Id., citing
TORTS

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

§ 674(b) (1977). This last element means that the plaintiff in an abuse of process claim

2

The same result is reached using ordinary agency rules. An attorney is the agent for the client.
Von Hake v. Thomas, 858 P.2d 193, 195 n.3 (Utah App. 1993). An agent is ordinarily immune if
acting for the principal and in the principal's interests. See Royal Resources v. Gibraltar Fin.
Corp., 603 P.2d 793, 795 (Utah 1979); Peterson v. Worthen Bank and Trust Co., 753 S.W.2d
278, 279 (Ark. 1988). Schulman acted on behalf of Abizaid and to protect Abizaid's community
property interests when she brought the motion in the California proceedings and recorded the lis
pendens. (R. 338, 347, 249).
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must have been a successful defendant in a prior action. See Baird v. lntermountain School Fed.
Credit Union, 555 P.2d 877, 878 (Utah 1976).
An attorney is not liable for abuse of process if there is a reasonable basis for the
proceedings.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 674, comment d. Moreover, attorneys are not

liable for abuse of process even if they are "convinced [the] client's claim is unfounded," so long
as they act "primarily for the purpose of aiding [the] client in obtaining a proper adjudication of
[the] claim." Id.
The main problem with appellant's abuse of process claim is that he did not defend, let
alone successfully, any prior action in which Schulman was a plaintiff. (R. 324, 249). He was,
instead, a respondent in a California divorce proceeding, and Schulman was the opposing
attorney. (R. 321, 322, 324, 249). The second problem is that appellant could not dispute
Abizaid's community property interest in the Utah property. (R. 321, 337-39, 256). There was,
therefore, a reasonable basis for the lis pendens.

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT CONCLUDED
CORRECTLY
THAT
APPELLANT'S CLAIMS WERE MOOT AFTER THE CALIFORNIA
COURT ORDERED THE RELEASE OF THE LIS PENDENS AND
ENTERED ITS RESTRAINING ORDER.

"If the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants, the case is
moot...." Cingolani v. UP&L, 790 P.2d 1219, 1222 (Utah App. 1990), quoting Black v. Alpha
Fin. Corp., 656 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1982). Here, the lis pendens was released more than a year
and a half before appellant filed his motion. (R. 313, 340, 180).
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Plaintiffs claims were moot the moment the California court ordered the lis pendens
released and, in the same order, replaced it with the restraining order. (R. 313). Appellant's
property was ultimately encumbered by a trust deed in favor of Abizaid. (R. 315). There was no
wrongful lien or other title-related claim left after the California court encumbered appellant's
property. The lis pendens did not encumber appellant's property. It merely gave notice of an
action that resulted in an encumbrance - precisely the purpose of a lis pendens. Hansen, 550 P2d
at 190; UTAH
V.

CODE ANN.

§ 78-40-2.

THIS COURT CAN AFFIRM ON ANY GROUNDS, INCLUDING
PRIVILEGE AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL.

An appellate court can affirm on any proper grounds. DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444
(Utah 1995). At least two other grounds recommend themselves. Both were argued in the trial
court.
A.

The act of causing the lis pendens to be recorded was privileged.

Because a lis pendens merely republishes pleadings in an underlying action, the recording
of a lis pendens is absolutely privileged. Hansen v. Kohler, 550 P.2d 186, 189-90 (Utah 1976).
"A party to a private litigation ... has an absolute privilege to disparage another's property in or
the quality of his land...in the institution of or during the course and as a part of a judicial
proceeding in which he participates if the disparagement has some correlation thereto." Id.,
quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 638.

"[Because] the publication of the pleadings is

absolutely privileged, the republication thereof... is similarly privileged." 550 P.2d at 190.

1£

Attorneys enjoy the same privilege. "An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to
publish false and defamatory matter of another in communications ... in the institution of, or
during the course and as part of a judicial proceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it has
some relation thereto." Price v. Armour, 949 P2d 1251, 1256 (Utah 1997), quoting Beezley v.
Hansen, 286 P.2d 1057, 1058 (Utah 1958).3
Three elements must be satisfied for this judicial proceeding privilege to attach:
(1) The statement must have been made during or in the course of a
judicial proceeding;
(2) The statement must have some reference to the subject matter of the
proceeding; and
(3) The statement must have been made by someone acting in the
capacity of judge, juror, witness, litigant, or counsel.
Price, 949 P2d at 1256.
The lis pendens gave notice of the California action—the divorce proceedings between
Abizaid and appellant. (R. 277). The property at issue was, as argued by appellant, purchased
after the divorce was final. But it was purchased with community funds. (R. 337, 338, 321 flf 3).
Under California law—the law governing the divorce proceedings—the court retained
continuing jurisdiction to adjudicate community property rights.
The court has continuing jurisdiction to award community estate assets . . . to the parties
that have not been previously adjudicated by a judgment in the proceeding. A party may file a
post-judgment motion or order to show cause in the proceeding in order to obtain adjudication of
any community estate asset or liability omitted or not adjudicated by the judgment.

3

Beezley relied on the first restatement of the law of torts, § 586. See Price 949 P2d at 1256.
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CAL. FAM. CODE

§ 2556.

Schulman advised the recording of the lis pendens to give notice of Abizaid's undisputed
community property interests. (R. 324, 322, 248, 338-39). The basis for the claim against
appellant's Utah property was that it was purchased with community funds, and title was
originally held by appellant and Abizaid. (R. 321-22, 337). Property derived from community
property remains community property. Marriage of Hicks, 211 Cal.App.2d 144, 152-53 (Cal.
App. 1962).
Therefore, the lis pendens was used for its proper purpose—it gave notice that the
California proceedings affected appellant's property. The California court ultimately agreed,
restraining appellant from transferring or encumbering that property, (R. 323 fl[ 12), 313), and
later ordering the trust deed to secure the payments to Abizaid. (R. 315).4
B.

Appellant's claims were barred by collateral estoppel.

Collateral estoppel, bars the "relitigation . . . of issues actually tried in a prior action, and
it may be invoked even though the subsequent cause of action is different from the former."
Robertson v. Campbell 61A P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah 1983).5
Collateral estoppel attaches when the following four requirements are met:
4

Under CAL. FAM. CODE § 2045, the court may issue an order "restraining any person from
transferring, encumbering...or in any way disposing of any property, real or personal, whether
community, quasi-community, or separate, except in the usual course of business...." The entire
privilege analysis is not even triggered, however, when the underlying conduct is not tortious.
Sampson v. Richins, 110 P.2d 998, 1003, n.2 (Utah App. 1989).

12

First, the issue in both cases must be identical. Second, the judgment must
be final with respect to that issue. Third, the issue must have been fully,
fairly, and competently litigated in the first action. Fourth, the party who
is precluded from litigating the issue must be either a party to the first
action or a privy of a party.
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 250 (Utah 1988), citing Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1374
(Utah 1988).
Appellant argued when he opposed the California motion that the lis pendens was
improper.

(R. 287-90). Although the California court released the lis pendens, it granted

Abizaid's motion for a restraining order. The California proceedings affected title or possession
to appellant's property, just as the lis pendens stated, because it has community property and the
court there used that property to secure the post-divorce obligations to Abizaid. (R. 313, 315,
340(H19)).
Appellant also sought attorney fees in the California proceedings based on his claim that
the lis pendens was improper. (R. 290, 340). In addition, appellant claimed attorney fees based
on the lis pendens from April 1, 1995 through the end of November, 1997. (R. 237, 242). The
California court, however, ordered a release of the lis pendens on April 19, 1996, and restrained
any disposition of appellant's property. (R. 313). Knowing that, appellant incurred $4,000 of his
fees in May of 1996, after the California court entered its order. (R. 242, 313). Fees based on
the lis pendens were already denied in California. (R. 323, 248).

3

Collateral estoppel, "more accurately described as the issue preclusion branch of the doctrine of
res judicata, "prevents the re-litigation of particular issues, as opposed to causes of action." See
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988).
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VI.

APPELLANT MAY NOT ARGUE ON APPEAL ISSUES NOT
PRESERVED BELOW.

An appellant's brief must include a statement of the issues and a citation to the record
demonstrating that each issue was preserved for appeal.

UTAH

R.

APP.

P. 24(a)(5). Issues not

preserved in the trial court cannot be argued on appeal. See Dansie v. Anderson Lumber Co., 878
P.2d 1155, 1158 n.9 (Utah App. 1994)(discovery rule argument to toll statute of limitations not
argued at trial was not preserved for appeal). Only exceptional circumstances—such that it is
impossible to raise the issue below—warrant appellate consideration of issues not preserved.
State v. Jaeger, 896 P.2d 42, 45 (Utah App. 1995).
Appellant failed to demonstrate the preservation of any of the issues. (Appellant's brief
at 1-2). More importantly, two of the issues raised were in fact not preserved. Appellant appears
to argue that mootness and privilege—arguments raised in Schulman's summary judgment
motion—were not pled as affirmative defenses and thus could not be argued at summary
judgment. (Appellant's brief at 2, f 7, and at 27, 41).
Appellant may not appeal on this issue. The arguments of mootness and privilege were
raised by Schulman in support of her cross-motion for summary judgment. (R. 331 (mootness),
327-29 (privilege). Instead of objecting, appellant argued the merits of these issues. (R. 356-57
(mootness), 349-54 (privilege).

Appellant cannot now charge error to the trial court for

considering the issues he elected to argue. Appellant wastes the effort in arguing the privilege
issue; that issue was not a basis (at least not expressed by the court) for the summary judgment.

on

Furthermore, it is doubtful that mootness is an affirmative defense. Affirmative defenses
descend from the common law "confession and avoidance." 5 C. Wright & A. Miller,
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

FEDERAL

§ 1270, at 411 (2d ed. 1990). A defendant is obligated to plead, if

available, the listed defenses in rule 8(c).

UTAH

R.

CIV.

P. 8(c). Mootness is not one of them,

and it is not a matter "constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense." Id.
Mootness does not suggest that the plaintiff states a prima facie case but that recovery is
otherwise barred. It is instead consumed in the denials of the particular allegations and the
defense of failure to state a claim (R. 36); which is to say that the plaintiff never reaches a prima
facie claim because the court is powerless to grant the requested relief. The "requested judicial
relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants . . . ." Cingolani, 790 P.2d atl222.6
VII.

APPELLANT'S OTHER ARGUMENTS ARE WITHOUT MERIT.

Appellant argues that, with respect to a lis pendens, the underlying action must be
pending in the county where the property is located. (Appellant's brief 16, 24). There is no
authority for such a statement. The statute requires only that the underlying action affect title to
or possession of real property.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-40-2. The only requirement—and it was

met here—is that the lis pendens be recorded in the same county as the property. Id

6

Moreover, the answer was filed on April 16, 1996. (R. 35). The hearing in California that
resulted in the restraining order on the Utah property was held on April 19, 1996. (R. 313). So
the results of the hearing were not yet known, but the case became moot as of the date of the
order.
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Because the Utah property was community property, the California court had jurisdiction
to adjudicate rights to it. It does not matter that it is located in Utah. Had appellant failed to
obey the California court's judgment, Abizaid would then have had to bring it to Utah as a
foreign judgment and seek enforcement here. See UTAH

CODE ANN.

§ 78-22a-l, et sec. But that

does not affect the community property rights adjudicated by the California court.
Appellant contends this case is controlled by Busch v. Doyle, 141 B.R. 432 (Bkrtcy. D.
Utah 1992). It is not. Busch was a dispute over sale proceeds from real property, not a claim of
community interest in the real property itself. Id. at 436. Here, appellant acquired the property
with community funds, making it community property under California law. Marriage of Hicks,
211 Cal.App.2d at 152-53.
That community property interest was never lost because Abizaid never relinquished it.
CAL. FAM. CODE

§ 2581 (there is a presumption of community property interests that can be

rebutted by either a clear statement in the deed or by "a written agreement that the property is
separate property.") Abizaid was entitled to assert that interest and, with the lis pendens, give
notice of that assertion.
All property held in joint title is community property "regardless of the date of
acquisition of the property or the date of any agreement affecting the character of the property [.]
[These rules] apply in all proceedings commenced on or after January 1, 1984." CAL. FAM.
CODE

§ 2580(c). It is undisputed in this case that the Utah property was originally held by

Abizaid and appellant as joint tenants, having been purchased with community funds. (R. 321,
337,218 (Tf 12).
Appellant contends that the lis pendens was a wrongful lien. (Appellant's Brief at 3233). First, the statute refers only to a "person who claims an interest in, or a lien or encumbrance
against, real property . . . ."

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 38-9-1 (before amendments). Schulman, of

course, never claimed any interest in appellant's property. (R. 322 (f 9), 248 (^f6). The rest of
the wrongful lien statute does not apply because the lis pendens did not contain a "material
misstatement or false claim . . . " § 38-9-1. Appellant concedes the central fact that the property
was purchased with community funds (R. 218, 346, 321).
CONCLUSION
Appellant's case is a set of facts in search of a legal theory. The undisputed facts,
however, demonstrate that there is no basis for the claims. The negligence and abuse of process
claims fail because the most critical elements are missing. At each turn, appellant runs squarely
into the undisputed fact that he purchased the Utah property with community funds, cloaking that
property with community interests. Abizaid was entitled to assert that interest in the post-divorce
proceedings. The lis pendens merely gave notice of the California divorce action, and properly
so inasmuch as it concerned as-yet unadjudicated community property. Any disposition of the
property was first restrained, and then the property was used to secure the debt to Abizaid. This
was also entirely appropriate because it was purchased with community funds.
claims, if there ever were any, were thus mooted.
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Appellant's

The trial court ruled correctly. This court should affirm.
DATED t h iS<3SLS>
s g y U day of October, 1998.
Respectfully submitted,
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C.
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 -2034

By.
DAVID C. WRIGHT
7
~~
Attorneys for Appellee Joanrje Schulman
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I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered two copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEE to the following this2Soay of October, 1998:
W. Kevin Jackson
Jensen, Duffin, Carman, Dibb & Jackson
311 South State Street, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2379
Attorneys for Appellant
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Tab A

ELLEN MAYCOCK - 2131
DAVID C. WRIGHT - 5566
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C.
Attorneys for Defendant Schulman
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034
Telephone: (801)531-7090
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID WINTERS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ALLISON ABIZAID and
JOANNE SCHULMAN,
individually,
Defendants.
ALLISON ABIZAID,
Cross-plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
)
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND GRANTING
) DEFENDANT JOANNE SCHULMAN'S
CROSS-MOTION FOR
)
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

]
]
,

vs.

}1

JOANNE SCHULMAN,

)

Cross-defendant.

Civil No. 95 090 8521 PI
Judge William A. Thome

)

Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment, filed on or about December 1, 1997, and
defendant Joanne Schulman's cross-motion for summary judgment were heard on March 19,
1998. Plaintiff was represented by W. Kevin Jackson, of Jensen, Duffin, Carman, Dibb &

Jackson, and defendant Schulman was represented by David C. Wright of Kruse, Landa &
Maycock. The cross-motions for summary judgment were fully briefed. At the hearing, counsel
for plaintiff stipulated that plaintiffs motion was to be treated as a motion for summary
judgment rather than partial summary judgment as plaintiff was seeking only the relief requested
in the motion and, if successful, would not pursue additional relief and that a ruling granting that
motion would be treated as a final judgment on the merits.
Having considered the memoranda and affidavits submitted by the parties, and for good
cause appearing, it is hereby
ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is denied for the reasons
contained in Schulman's memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs motion. It is further
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that, based on the undisputed facts as set
forth in defendant Schulman's combined memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs motion and in
support of her cross-motion, summary judgment is hereby granted in favor of Schulman as to
each of plaintiffs claims. The court rules that, as a matter of law, there was no duty running
between Schulman and plaintiff to support plaintiffs negligence claim. The court further rules
as a matter of law that the necessary elements of a prior action in which plaintiff was a successful
defendant is missing, and therefore summary judgment is appropriate as to plaintiffs claim for
abuse of process. The court further rules as a matter of law that Schulman is entitled to and is
hereby granted summary judgment as to plaintiffs quiet title/slander of title/wrongful lien
claims. Those claims were moot after the release of the lis pendens in the California proceedings
referred to by the parties in their respective memoranda and when the California court issued its
restraining order with respect to plaintiffs Utah property at issue in this action. This order
constitutes a final judgment as to each of plaintiff s claims against Schulman. It is further

ORDERED that each party will bear its own costs and attorneys fees incurred in this
action.
DATED this / ^ d a y of March, 1998.
<z*K
\

WILLIAM^. TH&R$£
DISTRICT COUR% JUDGE

f
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:

SON
PLAINTIFF

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING
DEFENDANT

JOANNE

SCHULMAN'S

CROSS-MOTION

FOR

JUDGMENT to the following, postage prepaid, t h i s ^ _ day of March, 1998:
W. Kevin Jackson
Jensen, Duffin, Carman, Dibb & Jackson
311 South State Street, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2379
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